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THE POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR 
GROUP LITIGATION 
Alexandra D. Lahav* 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the relationship between the democratic political order in the 
United States and class action or other group litigation?1  This Essay 
examines two aspects of that relationship.  First, it considers group 
litigation through the lens of the relationship between the individual and the 
state and argues that litigation can promote desirable ends such as citizen 
empowerment and deliberation.2  Second, it evaluates the structural 
implications of group litigation for the judicial branch and argues that group 
litigation can provide a safety valve for the executive and the legislature.  
These are significant justifications for enabling it.   
The debate over the legitimacy of the American class action has often 
been framed in terms of its internal structure and the protections it provides 
for absent class members.  This Essay argues that what legitimates the class 
action best is the role it plays in the larger polity rather than the internal 
protections it offers participants.  Concerns about autonomy of class 
 
*  Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.  Thanks to participants in the 
Fordham Lawyering for Groups Symposium, participants at the Tel Aviv University 
symposium on Corporate Liability and Human Rights, Leora Bilsky, Howard Erichson, and 
Judith Resnik for helpful comments on this piece. 
 1. I focus on the American class action and mass tort litigation models and on their 
legitimacy within the American political system. The legitimacy of international class 
actions heard in the United States, as illustrated by the Holocaust litigation case study, is an 
important issue not addressed here.  The reader should note that there has been a lot of 
comparative work on class actions. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class 
Actions:  An Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 7 (2009); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 179 (2009); Ángel R. Oquendo, Upping the Ante:  Collective Litigation in Latin 
America, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 248 (2009). 
 2. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004) 
(presenting arguments in favor of deliberative democracy).  There is significant debate over 
what kind of democracy we have in the United States and what we ought to have.  For a 
description and brief evaluation of models of democracy, see Amy Gutmann, Democracy, in 
2 A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 521 (Robert E. Goodin et al. 
eds., 2007) (describing different theories of democracy).  For some economic defenses of 
class action litigation, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); William B. Rubenstein, Why 
Enable Litigation?:  A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 
74 UMKC L. REV. 709 (2006). 
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members or agency costs remain important.3  But even if policy makers 
found the silver bullet for regulating them, this would not legitimate class 
actions or other group litigation.  Solutions to the legitimacy problem of 
class actions, to the extent that problem exists, cannot be found in the rules 
that govern class member participation, lawyer compensation, or judicial 
oversight.  Legitimacy depends on the role of the class action in the larger 
political order.  Accordingly, this Essay addresses the possibilities and 
limitations of class actions in the American political system. 
The role of group litigation in American representative democracy can be 
seen from two perspectives:  individual and structural.  The first perspective 
considers the extent to which litigation promotes good citizenship—in the 
sense of encouraging political participation, permitting the vindication of 
rights, clarifying legal rules and standards, and providing a forum for 
articulation and debate of fundamental principles and values. 
A second perspective sees the implications of group litigation for the 
structural role of courts in the constitutional order.  Perhaps more than other 
suits, group litigation puts pressure on the role of the judge.  Judges adopt 
an active role in group litigation, shaping disputes and sometimes 
attempting to resolve them even when the law provides an inadequate 
remedy.4  Group litigation also puts pressure on the executive and 
legislative branches.  Plaintiffs can use group litigation as a political tool to 
affect the relationship between different branches of government.  At the 
same time, the executive and legislative branches may pressure the 
judiciary to resolve complex disputes in order to relieve the other branches 
of government of their responsibility.  In short, group litigation is best 
understood as an element of government in the modern American state. 
I.  DEFINING LEGITIMACY 
To show that the key to the legitimacy of the class action is not its 
internal structure but its role in the political order requires a definition of 
legitimacy.  Only then can we consider what legitimates the class action 
device and whether the near exclusive focus of procedural scholarship on 
the class action’s internal structure ought to be reconsidered. 
In a useful article focusing on legitimacy in constitutional law, Richard 
Fallon identified three definitions of the term:  (1) legal legitimacy, 
(2) moral legitimacy, and (3) sociological legitimacy.5  Fallon correctly 
 
 3. For an essay on the internal governance of the class action weaving together strands 
from agency theory, political theory, and public choice theory, see Samuel Issacharoff, The 
Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165 (2013). 
 4. Compare Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281 (1976) (lauding the active role of judges in shaping disputes), with Judith 
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (pointing out the negative 
consequences of this new managerial role). 
 5. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1792–93 (2005). 
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points out that these three types of legitimacy are interrelated and not 
always distinguishable from one another.  Nevertheless, they provide 
valuable ways of thinking about this contested term. 
Legal legitimacy is measured by compliance with legal norms.6  Under 
this definition, a class action that comports with due process and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 can “legitimately” bind class members because 
it has complied with all the legal requirements for class treatment.  But is it 
fair to bind absent class members if these requirements have been met?  
This question invokes the idea of moral legitimacy. 
Moral legitimacy, sometimes referred to as political legitimacy, is 
concerned with whether a particular form of government is justified on the 
basis of moral principles.7  There are a number of theories of moral 
legitimacy.  For example, John Rawls proposed that a government is 
morally legitimate if citizens who do not know the particulars of their own 
situation would endorse it after fair deliberation.8  Some have argued that 
imagining a similar process among class members would legitimate the 
class action.9 
Frank Michelman offers another take on the question of moral 
legitimacy.  Michelman writes that a government is morally legitimate 
when it is “respect-worthy,” that is, all things considered, it is worth 
preserving even when it produces specific laws that are unjust.10  An 
inquiry into moral legitimacy urges us to ask whether, considering its role 
in extant political structure as a whole, the class action is legitimate.  This 
Essay adopts a version of Michelman’s approach. 
Sociological legitimacy measures the extent to which members of the 
relevant political community regard a law as justified.11  The study of the 
social psychology of procedural justice is largely based on this conception 
of legitimacy.12  One difficulty with sociological legitimacy is that just 
 
 6. See id. at 1794–95. 
 7. See id. at 1796–97. 
 8. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).  For a cogent 
description, see Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 315–16 (2004). 
 9. See David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson:  A 
Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279 
(2006). 
 10. Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way:  Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental 
System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 358 (2003) (“The core of a ‘legitimacy’ plea thus consists 
of two propositions:  first, that our country’s total, extant system of government by law is 
morally worth preserving (and here we would always implicitly be adding, considering the 
realistically available alternatives); and, second . . . that preserving it requires recognition 
all-round that the state is, so to speak, within its rights enforcing every law that issues from 
the system, including even some very bad and immoral ones.”).   
 11. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1795–96. 
 12. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (1990) (defining legitimacy by 
reference to “a conception of obligation to obey any commands an authority issues so long 
as that authority is acting within appropriate limits”); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A 
Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 
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because people obey a law does not mean that they think the law is 
legitimate.13  If, for example, all class members do not opt out of a 
settlement, and by virtue of their inaction are deemed to accept it, is this a 
sufficient condition for the court to say that the class action procedure was 
legitimate or that the outcome was just?14   
Another fundamental question for sociological legitimacy is whether the 
fact that people think a procedure is fair or an outcome just is a sufficient 
condition for legitimacy of that procedure or law when others think it unjust 
or unfair.  Let us imagine that a reliable poll determined that most people 
think class actions are a good procedure, is that sufficient to make class 
actions legitimate?  What if most people believed that the doctrine of virtual 
representation, rejected by the Supreme Court in a recent decision because 
it violated the individual’s right to his day in court, was a good idea and 
should be recognized?15 
Psychological studies can help illuminate attitudes toward a particular 
procedure.  For example, some studies suggest that people prefer 
adversarial proceedings to inquisitorial ones.16  Yet the class action fairness 
hearing lacks a true adversarial proceeding.  Because these studies were not 
conducted in the context of the class action, it is hard to know the extent of 
this procedural device’s sociological legitimacy.  Some scholars have 
claimed that the class action is widely perceived to be illegitimate, or would 
be if people knew more about it, but these assertions lack evidentiary 
support.17 
 
133–40 (1992) (describing findings that perceived fairness of process is critical to the 
perception of legitimacy of outcomes). 
 13. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1795–96; see also Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation 
in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379, 407–18 (critiquing the concept of 
sociological legitimacy and arguing that legitimacy is an inaccurate description of why 
people obey the law). 
 14. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in 
Class Action Litigation:  Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1560 
(2004) (documenting low opt-out rates and questioning the meaningfulness and efficacy of 
this procedural device). 
 15. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).  In Taylor, an individual filed a 
Freedom of Information Act suit and lost. Id. at 885.  Another individual, who looked legally 
identical to the first, filed essentially the same suit. Id.  The issue presented was whether the 
first suit could bind the participant in the second, virtually identical suit, and the Court held 
that it could not because every person is entitled to his day in court. Id. at 904. 
 16. JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:  A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 119–22 (1975); see also ALLAN E. LIND AND TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). 
 17. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE:  CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 52 (2009) (stating that there would be 
“widespread public outrage” if the general public knew of the effect of the class action 
procedure on substantive law).  A recent DRI study found that 65 percent of those surveyed 
thought the class action “makes corporations more responsible” and about the same 
proportion believe that it unfairly enriches plaintiffs’ attorneys. See Annual DRI National 
Poll on the Civil Judicial System, DRI, http://dri.org/news/PollHighlights (last visited Apr. 
19, 2013).  That poll was conducted by an institution with a vested interest in the answer, the 
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This Essay does not ask whether widespread support for a procedure such 
as the class action is necessary or sufficient for its acceptance as legitimate.  
Nor does it consider the legal legitimacy of class actions, which I take to 
mean the extent they comply with constitutional due process 
requirements.18  Instead, this Essay evaluates whether the class action is 
consistent with a conception of moral legitimacy, recognizing that the 
question is intertwined with questions of legal and sociological legitimacy.  
My thesis is that the class action’s moral legitimacy depends on the role that 
the class action plays in the larger political structure.  If the reader is 
convinced that the class action is legitimate in that sense, the next question 
is what internal structural changes need to be made to improve the function 
the class action serves in the political sphere. 
II.  CLASS ACTIONS,  INDIVIDUALS, AND THE STATE 
Litigation is a part of how U.S. citizens understand their relationship with 
the state and their place in the polity.  Traditionally litigation was a way for 
individual citizens to challenge the powerful state apparatus.19  In addition 
to providing a forum for individuals to assert their rights against the state, 
litigation is a mechanism for realizing of other aspects of the rule of law:  
transparency, accountability, and equality before the law.  Courts can also 
provide a forum for debate about significant political issues, and lawsuits 
may be a catalyst for this debate. 
A.  Transparency 
One way that litigation promotes transparency is by revealing 
information that is otherwise hidden or unavailable.20  Information is 
critical to good citizenship, for without it citizens cannot responsibly 
 
Defense Research Institute (DRI), which describes itself as the “Voice of the Defense Bar.” 
See DRI, http://www.dri.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).   
 18. I address the intersection between the Due Process Clauses and class actions 
elsewhere. Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 545 (2012). 
 19. The courts were (and are) the only governmental institution outside party control, 
but their relationship with the other branches of government is complex. See STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE:  THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 22–26 (1982).  Skowronek describes the 
nineteenth century interaction between the branches as follows:  “Judicial activism was a 
natural complement to an electoral-representative system that had a natural impulse to 
distribute benefits widely through logrolling politics (like the politics of granting special 
corporate charters) and to avoid, so far as possible, bold declarations of winners and losers in 
legislation.” Id. at 29; see also SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:  PUBLIC REGULATION 
AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) (describing the Congressional enactment of 
statutes providing for private enforcement mechanisms in order to entrench and decentralize 
regulation). 
 20. Transparency can have uses beyond information forcing, including framing 
narratives of motives, methods of understanding our world, and respect for others through 
communication and consultation.  We make meaning through litigation not only by asking 
the court to create narratives for us, but by the process of contesting those narratives.  
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deliberate on important issues, vote for representatives, or hold 
governments and other institutions (both public and private) accountable for 
their actions.  Producing information entails costs.  Information production 
is expensive and the release of information can be embarrassing, creating 
reputational costs.  These are some of the reasons for the ongoing battles 
over the scope of discovery. 
Consider the decision of participants to enroll in the 9/11 Victim 
Compensation Fund (VCF).21  Enrollment in the VCF required victims and 
their families to forego their right to sue.22  Many expressed regret at 
joining the VCF not necessarily because they thought they would get more 
money from a trial, but because they missed the opportunity to use the trial 
process to obtain information about government responsibility for the 
attacks.23  Despite the work of the 9/11 Commission, which investigated the 
tragedy, these potential litigants felt that there was more information to be 
discovered and, perhaps, other narratives to be told about the attacks which 
could only be done in the courtroom. 
Information forcing was also part of the calculus in the class action 
litigation against Swiss banks for retaining funds of Holocaust victims.24  
The lawyers prosecuting the lawsuits against the banks sought bank records 
that would reveal the names of Jewish account holders immediately 
preceding and during the Second World War.25  Without these records, 
there was no way of proving their claims, as the members of the class 
possessed no evidence of the deposit of the funds.26  The Swiss banks’ 
business has been based in large part on a promise of secrecy.  Opening 
their books could put their success at risk.   
It appears from later events that at one point the banks possessed records 
of the Jewish accounts but destroyed them.  Some speculative reasons for 
the destruction of documents include a desire to keep the funds, fear that 
they would be caught in a lie (having denied access to account holders and 
their heirs), and the reputational damage of having withheld these funds 
from Holocaust victims. 
 
 21. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:  
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008). 
 22. Id. at 650. 
 23. Id. at 663. 
 24. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(approving settlement in class action against Swiss banks concerning bank accounts 
belonging to Holocaust victims). See generally MICHAEL R. MARRUS, SOME MEASURE OF 
JUSTICE:  THE HOLOCAUST ERA RESTITUTION CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S (2009) (providing a 
historical description and evaluation of the litigation).  For a brief discussion in a larger 
meditation on vengeance and forgiveness and the role of memory, see MARTHA L. MINOW, 
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 111–12 (1998). 
 25. See generally Michael J. Bazyler, www.swissbankclaims.com: The Legacy and 
Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement with the Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 64 
(2001) (summarizing the obstacles faced by lawyers and class members in the Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litigation). 
 26. Id. at 75–76 n.28. 
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While the case was in its initial stages, Jewish leaders struck a deal with 
the Swiss banks to open their accounts to a select group headed by Paul 
Volcker, formally called the “Independent Committee of Eminent Persons” 
and more popularly known as the “Volcker Committee.”27  That group 
began reviewing the bank records and may have influenced the judge in the 
Swiss banks litigation to deny discovery requests during the initial stages of 
the litigation.28  Had the Swiss banks not allowed the Volcker Committee 
access, they may have faced the much harsher and more significant effects 
of discovery.  This is because evidence came to light during the course of 
the litigation that the banks had intentionally and systematically destroyed 
records.29  Spoliation of evidence of this kind can give rise to substantial 
monetary sanctions and adverse jury instructions at trial. 
What lessons can we learn from these examples?  Justice is impossible  
to achieve without access to information because there can be no real 
discussion of the underlying wrongs.  That discussion is necessary if there 
is to be a narrative of motives and ultimately a resolution.  There are 
numerous ways to access information.  In the Swiss banks litigation, an out 
of court compromise on the part of the defendant resulted in the release of 
some of the information needed for plaintiffs to understand what happened 
and to resolve the lawsuits.  Information may be released through 
nonadjudicatory bodies such as truth and reconciliation commissions.  Or 
information may come out in Congressional hearings, as it did in the 
aftermath of 9/11.  In other cases, litigation forces information into the 
public eye.  Litigation is a particularly powerful means of information 
forcing, and even the threat of civil discovery can result in disclosure.  By 
enabling litigation that cannot be brought individually, group litigation 
serves a critical role in a society that depends on litigation to unearth 
information. 
Any litigation can reveal information; it need not be an aggregated 
proceeding.  But aggregate litigation empowers plaintiffs who otherwise 
would not be able to bring suit individually.  Furthermore, the high profile 
nature of some class actions and other aggregate litigation also means that 
the information is publicized more readily than in individual litigation, 
which might receive less attention. 
 
 27. See Chronology:  In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, SWISSBANKCLAIMS, 
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Chronology.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (agreement 
entered on May 2, 1996). 
 28. Burt Neuborne, Transnational Holocaust Related Litigation in United States Courts:  
The Swiss Bank and German Slave Labor Cases 39 (June 22, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  Secrecy imposed by Swiss law likely had a role as well. 
 29. See Bazyler, supra note 25, at 75–76 n.28. 
 3200 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
B.  Accountability 
A second function of group litigation is to provide a means to hold 
individuals, organizations, and governments accountable for wrongdoing.30 
Group litigation especially enhances the ability of legal institutions to 
compensate individuals, vindicate individual rights, order prospective relief, 
and deter future misconduct.  Compensation, vindication, and deterrence 
make it possible to hold institutions and individuals accountable for their 
actions. 
Collective suits enable litigation.  Group litigation allows individuals 
who have been wronged to solve collective action problems that make it 
difficult to sue individually.31  Individuals are unlikely to have the 
wherewithal or resources to mount a lawsuit against powerful companies 
such as the Swiss banks, and they lack the capacity to band together and 
share knowledge and resources absent some aggregation procedure such as 
the class action.  Well-capitalized law firms, by contrast, have both the 
expertise and the resources to pursue extended and costly lawsuits on behalf 
of groups of plaintiffs, particularly when the result of the litigation will be a 
substantial common fund from which the lawyers can be paid a percentage 
fee.   
Imagine a lone Holocaust survivor trying to mount a lawsuit against the 
Swiss banks—where would she find a lawyer willing to represent her?  
Where would she find the money to pay the attorney’s fee?  How would she 
develop the kind of sophisticated theory of liability that the lawyers for the 
plaintiffs in the Holocaust litigation were able to develop?  It would be 
difficult indeed for any individual or inexperienced lawyer to navigate the 
legal thickets of jurisdiction, discovery, and motion practice in such 
complex litigation.  The same is true for domestic litigation, such as 
copyright suits against large internet companies32 or class actions sounding 
in equal protection law against the U.S. government.33 
C.  Equality 
A third requirement for democratic government is equality before the 
law.  This ideal is sometimes difficult to reconcile with the reality that 
individuals in the United States are not equal in resources, limiting their 
ability to access the court system and the procedures it provides for 
 
 30. Accountability can mean a number of things:  requiring defendants to pay for their 
wrongful conduct (retroactive accountability); preventing defendants from continuing with 
wrongful conduct (prospective accountability); and creating incentives for defendants to alter 
the structure of their institutions to prevent wrongful conduct.   
 31. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 9. 
 32. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y 2012) (lawsuit 
alleging copyright infringement in Google Books project); see also James Grimmelmann, 
The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 497 (2011). 
 33. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (dismissing a class action lawsuit against the 
Attorney General and FBI Director alleging conspiracy to discriminate on the basis of 
national origin and religion in the aftermath of 9/11). 
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vindicating rights.  The role of group litigation in promoting equality can be 
seen as two separate functions:  access to the law declaration (vindication) 
and distributive justice (remedies). 
First, consider the law declaration function of the courts.  Litigants who 
do not have the wherewithal to file a lawsuit or pursue it adequately are 
limited in their ability to participate in the judicial process.  As a result, they 
cannot effect changes in the law through judicial interpretation or obtain 
affirmations of their legal rights in the face of recalcitrant opponents.  Over 
time, this lack of access to the law declaration function of the courts can 
alter the law in favor of one group over others and can result in systematic 
exclusion.34  Enabling individuals to sue collectively can solve this problem 
by providing mechanisms to finance litigation and incentivizing lawyers to 
pursue lawsuits. 
Significant drawbacks to the way group litigation is pursued in the 
United States stand in the way of achieving the goal of access to the law 
declaration function of the courts.  The American court system has always 
struggled with the question of how to balance the law declaration function 
with the dispute resolution function.  In group litigation, the emphasis has 
leaned heavily toward resolving disputes, sometimes at the expense of law 
declaration.35  Some have indicated that this is what happened in the Swiss 
banks litigation as there were no rulings on substantive legal issues.36  
Instead, the case was settled (for a significant sum) before the liability of 
the Swiss banks was determined.37  This is exactly the point of settlement:  
to achieve closure before the merits are determined and the uncertainty that 
makes settlement attractive to both parties evaporates.  The size of the 
settlement amount also speaks to the culpability of the defendant and the 
wrongfulness of their actions, even if they deny liability in the settlement 
documents.  Nevertheless, the narrative of culpability that emerges in a 
settlement is different than one that would emerge through a trial process.  
The tension between law declaration and settlement can play out in a 
number of ways.  Perhaps a legal ruling is put off to spur settlement, or 
perhaps settlement is a judge’s way of avoiding a legal ruling he would 
prefer to leave unwritten for equity’s sake.  This tension raises deep 
jurisprudential questions about the role of the judge:  What ought to be his 
 
 34. The most influential discussion of this phenomenon remains Marc Galanter, Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 95 (1974). 
 35. Compare Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (criticizing 
settlements for preventing courts from fulfilling their law declaration function), with Samuel 
Isaacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 
(2009) (noting the benefits of settlements in dispute resolutions); see also Judith Resnik, 
Courts:  In and out of Sight, Site and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771 (2008) (underscoring the 
importance of transparency in the court system and highlighting concerns about secret 
settlements).   
 36. Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in 
American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 806–07 (2002). 
 37. See id. at 808–12. 
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fidelity to the formal law in the face of injustice?  How robust is the relative 
autonomy of law?  What is the role of the judge in an adversarial system 
and may he ever promote settlement?  To this last question, the American 
system has given an emphatic “Yes!” and has gone quite far in encouraging 
judges to manage their cases to promote settlement.38 
In light of these questions, consider the following evaluation of the Swiss 
banks litigation:  “Given many weaknesses in their cases, the enormous 
settlement Holocaust victims secured from Swiss banks might also illustrate 
how a district judge, bent on vindicating claims no matter how legally 
implausible, forces through some class action settlement.”39  This 
evaluation is perhaps what led some European critics to label American 
litigation as political in the sense that the judge places his policy preference 
for a particular outcome above the formal demands of the law.40  On the 
one hand, judicial decisions viewed as divorced from substantive legal 
requirements endanger the relative autonomy of law from the more rough 
and tumble world of politics and may ultimately delegitimize the courts.  
On the other hand, a judge’s failure to promote the just outcome where 
dictates of the formal law are at least unclear also delegitimizes the courts. 
A second equality promoting function of the courts is to effectuate 
distributive justice.  Group litigation is no exception to the generally 
understood phenomenon that most cases settle.41  The problem of 
distributive justice is of particular concern where allocation of the proceeds 
of the lawsuit must be made among class members who may be quite 
different from each other. 
In the Swiss banks litigation, for example, many individuals had no 
method of proving that they were the owners or heirs of the accounts in 
question because much of the documentation was destroyed.42  Other 
account owners were no longer living and no heirs could be found.  This 
left a significant amount to be distributed in a manner that was not purely 
 
 38. This emphasis on settlement is not all encompassing. Many lawsuits with class 
allegations do not settle and many cases are decided by motion rather than by settlement.  
Most lawsuits filed as class actions never obtain class action status.  The best currently 
available data indicates that only 30 percent of cases filed with class allegations ultimately 
seek class certification. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS:  PRELIMINARY 
FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 11 (2008), 
available at https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/cafa1108.pdf (“In the 231 sampled class 
actions, 70 motions to certify a class were identified.”).  About 10 percent of class actions 
settle, see id. at 16, while 3 percent ultimately are certified for litigation (although many of 
these settle as well). See id. at 11 tbl.9 (observing that 6 of 231 sampled class actions, or 2.6 
percent, were certified without restriction). 
 39. David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1985 
n.121 (2008). 
 40. MARRUS, supra note 24, at 32–33. 
 41. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 38, at 2 (observing that of the cases sampled, “all 
class actions in which a class was certified, whether for litigation or settlement purposes, 
ended with class settlements”). 
 42. See Bazyler, supra note 25, at 75–76 n.28. 
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compensatory.  The initial decision was made to prioritize compensation 
over need, so that individuals who could prove that they owned an account 
would be compensated for the losses they sustained.  This too is a difficult 
decision from a broad distributive justice perspective, as many Holocaust 
survivors were needier than those entitled to the funds.  The decision 
reflected the underlying legal principle that the money belonged to those 
who had deposited the funds. 
One of the five classes in the Swiss Banks litigation—the looted assets 
class—proved to be impossible to administer because no records existed.  
Ultimately, that portion of the settlement was distributed to the poorest 
survivors.  The  doctrine of cy pres, which in the class action context allows 
funds to be distributed to their next best use when they cannot be given 
directly to injured class members, made this possible.43  Often cy pres 
distributions are awarded to charities related to the underlying subject 
matter of the suit.  Cy pres awards have been controversial because they are 
somewhat distanced from the compensation imperative of the law.44  In the 
Swiss banks litigation, the court and the claims administrator determined 
what would be the best allocation among living Holocaust survivors, with 
input from various stakeholders.45  There was significant disagreement and 
ultimately the process of determining allocation of these funds was moral 
and political rather than legal, as only the loosest legal principles governed 
the distribution of funds post settlement.46 
Because the settlement and its distribution were court sanctioned, it was 
important that the distribution be just in the eyes of the class members, the 
litigants, and the public at large.  To reach a compromise that appeared just 
to all interested parties, the court not only conducted a fairness hearing but 
the magistrate overseeing the distribution scheme did a considerable 
amount of work communicating with the relevant groups.  The distribution 
itself was a result of a dialogue among parties who had difficulty reaching 
agreement and demonstrates the importance of deliberation to attaining 
results that respect human autonomy and broader commitments to justice.  
Litigation provided the forum for this deliberation, first in the form of more 
stylized legal arguments before the court, later through settlement 
negotiations, and ultimately settlement administration. 
D.  Deliberation 
Courts provide a forum for reasoned deliberation.  Participation in 
reasoned deliberation is one way to give effect to dignity and autonomy 
 
 43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (9th ed. 2009).   
 44. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 
1957–58 (2011) (discussing cy pres awards). 
 45. See Neuborne, supra note 36, at 808–13. 
 46. See id. 
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values.47  In the traditional binary lawsuit, litigants may participate by 
consulting with their lawyer about the course of the litigation, perhaps 
being subject to a deposition or medical evaluation, appearing as a witness 
at trial, or participating in settlement negotiations.  In class actions, such 
direct participation in the course of the litigation is not possible, if only 
because many absent class members do not even know they are a part of the 
litigation until settlement.  Instead, class actions offer an opportunity to 
participate directly by speaking out in a fairness hearing.48  
Not every class action is likely to produce a robust hearing.  For example, 
consumer class actions—where what is at stake is a statutory penalty or the 
refunding of a banking fee—may be treated differently than a case such as 
the Swiss banks litigation.49  This is because of the symbolism of what is at 
stake.  In a small-claims consumer class action, the nature of the violation is 
impersonal and lacks a political charge.  The primary purpose of consumer 
class actions is deterrence, because the compensation for individuals is so 
small.  By contrast, in the Swiss banks litigation, although the suit sounded 
in contract, it evoked a narrative of the attempt to silence and erase the 
existence of the victims of the Holocaust.  This undercurrent added political 
significance to the litigation.  As a result, the opportunity to participate by 
writing to the judge or speaking at the fairness hearing was a critical 
component of a fair process.  The opportunity to speak and to be heard in an 
official setting is probably the closest a court proceeding can come to 
promoting individual dignity. 
In the larger historical picture, the fairness hearing in the Swiss banks 
litigation gave the victims an opportunity to tell their story in a formal 
proceeding and a public space,50 and thereby contribute to the historical 
record.51  But the desire to produce a narrative testimony before the court is 
not limited to such extreme circumstances.  Permission to tell the court 
one’s story is for some the irreducible minimum of just procedure, even if 
the telling does not directly result in a legal ruling.  Judge Alvin Hellerstein, 
who oversaw all the litigation related to the tragedy of 9/11, told me a story 
 
 47. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:  The Quest for a 
Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and 
Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS:  NOMOS XVIII 126, 127–
28 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural 
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 273–304 (2004). 
 48.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of settlements in class actions).   
 49. For a contrasting example, the Google Books settlement spurred a fairness hearing 
with testimony from individual authors, groups of authors, and even foreign governments.  
See James Grimmelmann, Future Conduct and the Limits of Class-Action Settlements, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 387 (2013) (describing and criticizing the Google Books settlement); cf. 
Pamela Samuelson, The Google Books Settlement As Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 
479 (considering the benefits of the Google Books settlement).   
 50. See PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM:  CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND 
THE ZIONIST CENTURY 148–62 (1997) (describing the role of Eichmann trial in giving a 
public opportunity for victims to tell their story and its tension with the judicial role). 
 51. See Leora Bilsky, The Judge and the Historian:  Transnational Holocaust Litigation 
As the New Model, 24 HIST. & MEMORY 117, 129–30 (2012). 
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of the firefighters who were denied relief in their lawsuit against New York 
City.  Although they lost their case on a dispositive motion, meaning there 
was no trial, they nevertheless asked the court for the opportunity to tell 
their stories.  The judge listened.  Similarly, in the related litigation 
concerning illnesses suffered by first responders, Judge Hellerstein held a 
fairness hearing, although no rule of procedure requires one when a case 
that is not a class action is settled.52   
Speaking at a fairness hearing is not a sufficient condition for making the 
outcome of the litigation substantively just from the litigant’s point of 
view.53  In our adversarial system, we rely on participants in the judicial 
system to present arguments to the court and on the court to weigh those 
arguments neutrally.  Accordingly, the fairness hearing can be an 
opportunity to educate the judge, especially when objectors at the fairness 
hearing are sincere and represented by rigorous and capable counsel.  But 
providing the judge with information is not the only purpose of the fairness 
hearing. 
The ongoing fights between different factions in any litigation where a 
great deal is at stake, as in the Swiss banks litigation, demonstrate that 
people both want the opportunity to be heard and to be obeyed.  The right to 
speak on its own does not guarantee that the outcome will be just.  A 
hearing should not be understood as a replacement for substantive justice, 
but it is nevertheless a separate piece of the puzzle which recognizes that 
the dignity of the individuals is an important part of court proceedings.  
Permitting the individual to voice his or her disagreement, even if it 
ultimately leads nowhere, is a special function of the courts in a democratic 
society.  This is one way that the judiciary differs from the legislative and 
executive branches.54 
III.  CLASS ACTIONS AND INTERBRANCH RELATIONS 
So far this Essay has focused on the individual, and discussed the ways in 
which group litigation can promote citizenship and deliberation in 
American democracy.  I now turn to the implications of group litigation for 
the structure of government, in particular the relationship between the 
 
 52. See generally Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging:  The 9/11 
Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (2012).  
 53. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that procedural justice is an important component 
of why people obey the law. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (presenting social-psychological studies which 
demonstrate that procedural justice is important for individuals who have not prevailed in 
accepting losses in adjudicative settings). 
 54. This is one reason why the newly adopted pleadings regime raises concerns—can the 
plausibility pleadings test allow for individuals to have their day in court, especially when 
bringing claims where the evidence is of a defendants’ state of mind or is information only 
available to the defendant? See generally Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited 
and Revised:  A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) 
(discussing the uses and potential abuses of screening mechanisms for complaints). 
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courts and other governmental branches.  The structural implications of 
group litigation are threefold.  First, the courts’ role in group litigation may 
raise concerns about the improper expansion of judicial power when courts 
facilitate settlements rather than ruling on the legal questions at issue.55  
Second, participants may use the litigation process in order to gain the 
attention of the other branches of government or the public as part of a 
broader publicity strategy.  In such cases the court’s resolution of the 
controversy is secondary to the articulation or broadcast of the controversy.  
The litigation becomes part of a broader democratic dialogue.  Third, the 
legislative or executive branches may prefer to allow the courts to resolve 
pressing social or political problems because they are unable to do so 
themselves.  Should this be an option? 
A.  The Proper Role of Courts 
The court’s role in facilitating a settlement class may look like an 
overreach of judicial power, although whether it is categorized as such 
depends on one’s view of what courts do in the ordinary case and what their 
relationship is with the other branches of government.56  The traditional 
views of what courts do split into a dispute resolution function and a law 
declaration function, sometimes also loosely overlapping with the 
public/private distinction.  Law declaration is often assumed to be more 
important for the public regarding function of law, especially for civil rights 
cases or suits against the government, whereas dispute resolution is 
understood as a more private function.  As ideal types, these descriptions 
are useful but they do not reflect reality.  The court’s role is both to resolve 
the dispute and declare the law.57  Where there is a trial, these two functions 
overlap almost completely.  Where there is a private settlement, they 
diverge.  
In the group litigation context, where a settlement must be approved by 
the court and is accompanied by public fairness hearings, the two functions 
intersect in ways that are not always satisfying for those seeking categorical 
answers to the law declaration/dispute resolution divide.  For example, in 
the Swiss banks litigation, plaintiffs brought claims for money damages on 
behalf of Holocaust survivors and their heirs.  The ability of the court to 
resolve this dispute through a settlement was dissatisfying for those who 
wanted not only compensation but vindication through a judicial declaration 
 
 55. Settlement practices are more concerning when there is legal authority weighing 
against one of the parties than when the outcome is uncertain.   
 56. There is voluminous literature on the judges’ role. Compare, e.g., Chayes, supra 
note 4 (arguing in favor of judicial involvement in dispute framing and resolution), with 
Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27 (2003) 
(defending the traditional, more neutral judicial role).  One of the best articles on this topic 
remains Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 4, at 374 (critiquing the modern 
judicial propensity to manage and shape litigation and influence its results). 
 57. Additionally, resolving a dispute not only has private effects for the parties, but also 
larger public effects such as deterrence. 
 2013] POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR GROUP LITIGATION 3207 
that the Swiss banks behaved wrongfully.  When the parties settled the 
Swiss banks litigation for a great deal of money and the court adjudicated 
the fairness of the settlement, did this in fact signal something that came 
close to law declaration?58  Compare the resolution of the Swiss banks 
cases with asbestos litigation.  There the Supreme Court rejected a massive 
settlement that purported to solve a longstanding problem facing both the 
courts and the legislative branches.  Although the Court regretted that no 
legislative resolution was forthcoming, it ultimately found that the cases 
could not be settled as a class action for fairness reasons.59  This left the 
disputes unresolved and the liability uncertain.  
In the context of mass tort settlements, Martha Minow observes:  “A 
judge who engages in the process of creating administrative responses to 
social problems is also inevitably immersed in political views, but lacks the 
tethering or camouflage of the traditional adjudicatory procedure.”60  This 
tethering is important in part because it preserves the sociological 
legitimacy of the court against accusations of overreaching.  Maintaining 
the relative autonomy of law is also necessary for moral legitimacy.  In the 
context of court responses to atrocity, including the Swiss banks litigation 
described earlier, Minow writes that “making law dependent on the vagaries 
of politics, risks jeopardizing the very aspiration of law to be impartial, fair, 
and steady, and thereby distinct from strategic power and individual 
personalities.”61  As noted earlier, courts have significant discretion in 
determining whether a settlement is fair, and there is no requirement that 
the court provide a final declaration of the underlying law when a case is 
settled.62  As a result, one might ask whether the tether to traditional 
adjudicatory procedure is sufficient to lend moral legitimacy to the class 
action settlement process, especially where there have been no dispositive 
motions. 
Perhaps the answer ultimately rests on a convergence of sociological and 
moral legitimacy based on a shared sense of satisfaction with the outcome 
among class members and the general public.  If the outcome is broadly 
understood as fair, if the distribution of proceeds from the settlement seems 
just, if the amount of settlement seems a sufficient signal of contrition, then 
perhaps this is enough—even without a legal ruling or apology.  Perhaps 
substantive justice can overcome a process that does not reflect the ideal of 
 
 58. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627–29 (1997).  For a critique 
of the Amchem settlement, see generally Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:  
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995).  For a discussion of 
bankruptcy as a solution to the problem posed by asbestos litigation, see Troy A. McKenzie, 
Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-class Aggregate Litigation, 87 NYU L. REV. 960, 969 
(2012).  
 60. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation:  Judge Weinstein and the Creator of 
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2022 (1997). 
 61. MINOW, supra note 24, at 40. 
 62. See supra Part I.C–D. 
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adjudication and thereby make the entire political system more worthy of 
respect.  But where there is disagreement among the beneficiary class 
members, or where the public perception is that the settlement is 
insufficient relative to the allegations or unjust in its allocation, the chain 
tethering adjudicatory process to the settlement may not be able to bear the 
weight of disappointment. 
B.  Political Struggle in the Courts 
Concerns about class treatment and particularly class action settlements 
have often been viewed through the lens of concern over court overreaching 
in relation to the political branches.  But filing and prosecuting a lawsuit 
also provides a forum for litigants to project their voices into the political 
debate and a means to communicate through the suit outside the formal 
constraints of the law.  For example, complaints in controversial cases often 
contain a preamble paragraph, not necessary to meet any procedural 
requirements but useful as a publicity tool.63  The Swiss banks litigation 
complaints contained such a paragraph as well as a narrative of the victims’ 
stories.64  
Group litigation, by virtue of the size of the plaintiff class and often the 
size of the damages requested, may increase the volume of plaintiffs’ 
protests even further.  One imagines that many discrimination suits were 
filed against Wal-Mart before Dukes v. Wal-Mart65 made national 
headlines, first as a class action in district court and ultimately at the 
Supreme Court level.66  Similarly, a class composed of Holocaust survivors 
commands greater interest than an individual suit and thereby focuses 
attention to the injustice of the Swiss banks’ behavior. 
There are other means of communication on the public stage.  Filing a 
lawsuit may not be the first public relations strategy that comes to mind.  
Nevertheless, large-scale lawsuits, be they class actions or aggregations, 
must be recognized as one method that Americans use for political 
communication as well as dispute resolution.  As Jules Lobel has explained, 
“courts not only function as adjudicators of private disputes, or institutions 
that implement social reforms, but as arenas where political and social 
movements agitate for, and communicate, their legal and political 
agenda.”67  Under this model of the courts, the outcome of the lawsuit plays 
a diminished role, and perhaps the judge does as well.  In addition to a 
favorable ruling, “[t]he litigation can serve a variety of roles:  to articulate a 
 
 63. See, e.g., Samuel J. Terilli et al., Lowering the Bar:  Privileged Court Filings As 
Substitutes for Press Releases in the Court of Public Opinion, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 143 
(2007) (arguing in favor of using filings as press releases).   
 64. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 96-5161 
(E.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997), available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Documents/weiss
haus%20amended.pdf. 
 65. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).   
 66. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 67. Jules Lobel, Courts As Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 479 (2004). 
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constitutional theory supporting the aspirations of the political movement, 
to expose the conflict between the aspirations of law and its grim reality, to 
draw public attention to the issue and mobilize an oppressed community, or 
to put public pressure on a recalcitrant government or private institution to 
take a popular movement’s grievances seriously.”68  Stuart Eizenstat, the 
Clinton Administration official who was most involved with the Holocaust 
litigation, said that the suits were “simply a vehicle for a titanic political 
struggle, which was messy, sometimes unseemly, and constantly 
frustrating.”69  Groups or perhaps whole social movements can use the 
courts as a way to amplify or illustrate their message and to communicate 
with other branches of government.  Enabling this communication supports 
the ideal of a deliberative democracy that respects the rights and claims of 
all persons equally. 
C.  A Legislative Back-up Plan 
The third way that the relationship between the political branches can 
play out in group litigation is when the executive or legislative branch 
specifically seeks court resolution to avoid the political costs that might 
arise from their actions.  While this is not common, it is a recurring 
phenomenon.  In the Swiss banks litigation, Eizenstat received significant 
praise for the key public role he played in helping the parties reach a 
resolution.70  Speaking of the adjudication, Eizenstat explained that 
“external pressures and intervention of the U.S. government compensated 
for the serious flaws in the legal cases.”71 
In other parts of the Holocaust litigation, the relationship between 
litigation and executive action was more direct.  The Clinton 
Administration and the German Chancellor ultimately settled the piece of 
the Holocaust litigation concerning the use of slave labor by corporations.72  
That agreement did not emanate from a court.  Instead, it was an executive 
agreement on the part of the German government to fund reparations in 
exchange for (among other things) a promise from the U.S. government that 
it would prevent further lawsuits.73  The lawsuits were the catalyst and the 
backdrop for this governmental action, but the relief ultimately came from a 
political compromise rather than a judicially sanctioned one. 
Anthony Sebok critiques the resolution of the German slave labor cases:   
 
 68. Id. at 480. 
 69. See MARRUS, supra note 24, at 28 (quoting Stuart Eizenstat). 
 70. Id. at 16. 
 71. Id. at 18. 
 72. Id. at 21. 
 73. There is a dispute over whether the promise of protection from lawsuits had any 
value given the treaties and underlying law. Anthony J. Sebok, Un-settling the Holocaust 
Litigation (Part II), FINDLAW (Aug. 29, 2000), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20000
829.html. 
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Although it is supposed to illustrate the power of the individual suing in 
private law against private corporations, in reality it reaffirms the primacy 
of the state.  The agreement occurred because the German government 
offered the money and the American government offered the protection.  
On their own, without the help of the two governments, the forced labor 
plaintiffs almost surely would have lost, for their claims had been legally 
extinguished long before the agreement was made.74 
I am not sure the lawsuits were meant to epitomize the individual against 
the state—the private against the public.  These lawsuits were brought on 
behalf of groups who had agitated and protested the failure of governments 
to compensate them for their suffering and restore their property.  In this 
sense, the lawsuits were associational rather than individual.  Although the 
allegations in these lawsuits sounded in the private law of torts, restitution, 
and unjust enrichment, they were also using the medium of these doctrines 
to assault the political compromises reached in the wake of the Second 
World War.  These lawsuits combined both private values (compensation) 
and public values (deterrence and vindication) far more than an ordinary 
tort suit might. 
The asbestos litigation that culminated in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor75 is an example of the courts refusing to solve a broad social 
problem.  The widespread use of asbestos in the United States caused 
hundreds of thousands of injuries and lawsuits.  Ultimately, after 
congressional attempts to solve the problem by legislation failed, lawyers 
negotiated a massive settlement.  The Supreme Court rejected the 
settlement as unfair to claimants, particularly future claimants.76  The 
opinion began with a lament.  It described a U.S. Judicial Conference Ad 
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation Report that had recommended a 
legislative solution to the massive influx of asbestos cases across the 
country.  Justice Ginsburg wrote:  “Real reform, the report concluded, 
required federal legislation creating a national asbestos dispute-resolution 
scheme.  As recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States urged Congress to act.  To this date, no 
congressional response has emerged.”77  Congress, one can deduce, would 
have liked a court-created solution to this problem.  The Court, rigorously 
applying the requirements of Rule 23, declined to assist.78 
All of this raises the question of the appropriate structure of government.  
The traditional view of separation of powers is based on the idea that the 
judicial branch’s independence requires separation of the judicial from the 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 76. See id. at 626–28.  For an argument that the settlement was unfair, see generally 
Koniak, supra note 59. 
 77. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 598 (citations omitted). 
 78. For a brief overview of the controversy, see Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation 
in the United States:  Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 
255 (2006). 
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executive and legislative.  But there are a number of ways in which the 
federal courts’ formal independence from the other branches of government 
is not the whole story.  For example, judges depend on the legislative 
branch to pay their salaries and the costs of running the court system;79 they 
depend on the executive to enforce their rulings; and, many believe, they 
depend on the people to sustain their legitimacy.80  In other words, the 
branches of government are intertwined and interdependent while 
simultaneously autonomous and separate.81  Some separation must be 
maintained in order for the courts to review governmental action 
independently and to defend unpopular or minority rights in the face of 
powerful majority interests.  At the same time, some cooperation is 
necessary to resolve the complex cases that arise in the wake of mass harms 
and to make the compromises necessary for resolving those cases. 
The difficulty lies in drawing the line between autonomy and cooperation 
in a way that does not rip the tether to adjudicative procedure, even if it 
does stretch it a bit uncomfortably.  That difficulty cannot be resolved here 
except to note that in the cases that raise significant complex issues 
involving injury to large numbers of people, an exception to the norms of 
binary adjudication is appropriate in order to have government both worthy 
of respect and one that accords respect to its citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has argued that the legitimacy of the class action device ought 
to rest on the role it plays in the larger political structure.  This thesis can be 
contrasted with those who argue that the legitimacy of the class action 
device is derived from its internal structure and the protections it provides 
individual class members.  The political role of the class action has 
implications for individual citizens and the structure of government.  On the 
individual level, collective litigation helps achieve some of the key values 
of a desirable democratic society—values associated with the rule of law:  
transparency, accountability, equality, and deliberation.  To the extent the 
class action performs these functions (and is reformed to perform them 
better) it is morally legitimate. 
On the broader social level, collective litigation may be more troubling as 
it appears to upset the traditional role of the courts as separate and 
 
 79. The Constitution provides that judges “shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  Nevertheless, the legislature writes the check, determines 
the amount, and decides on raises for the judiciary.  
 80. “The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately 
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(explaining the courts’ power as largely one of public trust). 
 81. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (stating that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity”). 
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independent from the other branches of government and, in the process, 
perhaps endangers the relative autonomy of law.  Because collective 
litigation, however imperfect, enables group protest and inspires solutions 
to major social problems, it provides an important element in the larger 
political structure.  Ultimately, the moral legitimacy of the class action on 
the societal level depends on the extent to which the results of the litigation 
fit the substantive law and the ideal of justice.82  The difficulty for judges 
has been opining on this very question, especially in the settlement context.  
Instead of determining whether a settlement is substantively fair, judges 
have focused on a set of procedural factors that serve as indicia of fairness, 
such as the reaction of the class to the settlement, in terms of the number of 
opt outs and objectors, or how vigorously the lawyers litigated.83  The 
courts’ difficulty in approving the substantive outcomes of class litigation 
remains a significant challenge for the moral legitimacy of the class action 
device. 
The next step, therefore, is to consider what internal structural changes 
need to be made to improve the function the class action serves in the 
political sphere.  I have pointed to settlement approval as one area for 
improvement.  There are others.  As changes to Rule 23 are considered, 
they should be evaluated in terms of the larger political role the class action 
plays.  In other words, changes to the class action procedure should be 
adopted when they improve the role the class action can play in political 
order outside the litigation.   
 
 82. In this sense, sociological legitimacy feeds political legitimacy. 
 83. For example, courts sometimes look at the “Grinnell factors” to judge fairness of a 
settlement.  The Grinnell factors are (1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the 
litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and 
the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of 
establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the 
ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of 
the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; (9) the range of reasonableness of 
the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. City 
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974).  In an earlier article, I 
suggested that these nine factors were “substantive.” Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental 
Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 138 n.341 (2003).  Upon 
reflection, this is incorrect.  Factors (1), (2), and (3) are really procedural considerations.  
The remaining factors all boil down to one question:  How does this settlement compare to 
what plaintiffs could get at trial, discounted for risk of loss? 
